Article written by Matty Reiss, March 12th

Peace with Iran May/May Not be Close

The guns are still firing, but history shows that even the bitterest conflicts end at a table. Here is what reconciliation between Washington and Tehran might require.

It is difficult, in the middle of a war, to imagine peace. Yet throughout history, the most entrenched conflicts, from the Korean Peninsula to the Cold War standoff between Washington and Moscow, have eventually given way to negotiation, compromise, and, however fragile, stability. The current US–Iran conflict, now entering its second week of strikes and retaliation, feels like the end of something. But it may also be the beginning of a new chapter, one in which both nations, stripped of the illusions that sustained decades of hostility, are finally forced to confront what a lasting arrangement might actually require. To be clear: a peace deal between the United States and Iran will not come quickly or easily. The obstacles are enormous, the mistrust runs deep, and the domestic politics in both countries make compromise politically dangerous. But the outlines of a workable framework, built on hard-won lessons from previous negotiations and the brutal education of the present conflict, are not impossible to imagine. Three pillars would need to be at the center of any serious effort.

A Nuclear Settlement Built to Last

Every serious attempt at US–Iran diplomacy over the past two decades has been, at its core, a negotiation over nuclear weapons. The 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action offered a template, but its fatal weakness was that it was not built to endure changes of government on either side. When the Trump administration withdrew in 2018, the entire architecture collapsed. A durable successor agreement would need to be qualitatively different. Congressional Republicans have already signaled that Senate ratification, which requires a two-thirds majority, would only be possible if Iran fully dismantles its enrichment capabilities, not merely limits them. Before the current conflict broke out, Iran had shown remarkable flexibility on one key point: agreeing in principle never to stockpile enriched uranium. That was a genuine breakthrough, hailed by Omani mediators as something that had never been achieved before. Any future peace framework would need to build on that foundation and go further, covering ballistic missiles, verification mechanisms, and the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency, while offering Iran something it has long craved: economic reintegration and a path back into the global financial system.

Regional Security Guarantees That Address Both Sides' Fears

Iran has long justified its nuclear ambitions and its network of proxy forces, from Hezbollah to the Houthis, as essential deterrents against an existential threat from Israel and the United States. The US and Israel, meanwhile, point to those same proxy forces as proof that Iran cannot be trusted as a regional actor. This circular logic has fueled decades of escalation. A peace deal that addresses only the nuclear file, without tackling the broader question of regional security, would be a house built on sand. A serious settlement would need to include binding commitments on Iran's support for armed non-state actors, accompanied by security assurances from the US that it will not pursue regime change. This is politically toxic in Washington, but it is the kind of mutual concession without which no lasting agreement has ever been struck in the modern Middle East. The Abraham Accords demonstrated that Gulf states are willing to reshape their relationships with Israel for the right incentives. A broader regional framework, one that brings Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and even a post-war Iran into a new security architecture, could serve as the scaffolding for a more stable Middle East.

An Economic Bridge That Makes Peace Worth Having

Sanctions have devastated the Iranian economy. The rial has been in near freefall, inflation has been crushing, and the Iranian middle class, once among the most educated and globally connected in the region, has been hollowed out. This economic suffering has, paradoxically, been both a driver of nuclear negotiations and an obstacle to them: it creates pressure to deal but also stokes nationalist resentment that makes compromise look like capitulation. A genuine peace deal would need to offer Iran a credible economic dividend. Vice President JD Vance articulated this plainly before the conflict erupted, noting that a deal would allow Iran to rejoin the global economy. That means not just nuclear sanctions relief, but a phased, verifiable process by which Iran could regain access to international financial markets, resume oil exports, and attract foreign investment. The sanctions architecture would need to be designed so that relief is graduated and reversible, enough to give Iran a genuine stake in compliance, but structured so that violations trigger automatic consequences. None of this is imminent. The current conflict has set back the cause of diplomacy by years, perhaps decades. Iran's foreign minister has said that talks with the US may no longer be on the table at all. Domestic politics in Tehran, where a new supreme leader is consolidating power, make compromise especially difficult to sell. In Washington, the appetite for engagement has rarely been lower. But conflicts end. They end because the costs of war eventually outweigh the costs of compromise. The question is not whether the US and Iran will one day sit across a table, they almost certainly will. The question is how much destruction will be required before both sides are ready to build something different. The blueprints for that something are already being drafted, in quiet corners of foreign ministries and think tanks, by people who believe the storm, however violent, will not last forever.