Article written by Bozena Smith, March 27 2026

Tel Aviv, Israel. March 24, 2026. Erik Marmor/Getty

    Since early January of 2026 and the 12th day of protests, Iran has been operating under a total internet blackout imposed by Iranian authorities. The internet blackout is needless to say, a shameless attempt by the Iranian government to cover up the sheer volume of deaths that have occurred in Iran over the short period of time, and to direct the world’s gaze away from the carnage and geopolitical instability. The blackout itself initially did not affect satellite connections, but as the government's efforts have increased to shut down exposure to events within Iran, specific satellite dishes have been targeted and operations to dismantle them have further characterized the injustice of the already sickening circumstances. 

To give a perspective on the worsening conditions of censorship, on February 16, internet traffic levels in Iran dropped to 50%. Compare that already low number to a more recent report, which reads that the internet connectivity has dropped further still to a staggering 4%. As of March 6, the connectivity level is 1%. Suffice to say, Iran is living in a shadow of confusion and uncertainty pertaining not only to the already devastating conditions in Tehran and the rest of the country, but now contributed to by the information black hole they live in. 

It is important to consider the implications of this backout to the Iranian people living within its haze. Most importantly and frighteningly of all, the Iranian people live in wartime conditions without any technological means of anticipating and locating attacks. They are without an advanced warning system, a system that is the responsibility of the government to provide to its people. Iran has had a history of government digital oppression, and we see this now more than ever. “All broadcasting from Iranian soil is controlled by the state and reflects official ideology. There is a wider range of opinions online and in the press. (BBC)”

Despite the internal lack of access, Iran’s people are not without hope. Since the 12th day, a technology rebellion has taken place, rocketed into action by Iranian digital rights activists and volunteers. These workers have created an app called Mahsa Alert, which is designed to keep Iranians in the know about potential threats such as missile launch sites, and targeted attacks in their area. Without organized government service, the crowdsourced platform Mahsa is Iran’s new alert system, and works by broadcasting alarms on the app and geotagging key military facilities on a map of the country when areas or sites are the confirmed target locations of Israeli attacks. 

Ahmad Ahmadian, the creator of Mahsa, is the president and CEO of US-based digital rights group Holistic Resilience. In order to ensure Iranian citizens could access the apps technology within the country, Ahmadian’s group had to facilitate antennas among them. Given analysis of the basic user information the app collects, Ahmadian claims that it is within reason to estimate that 28% of users are successfully accessing the platform from inside Iran. 

“His group has supplied "up to 200" antennas to individuals in Iran, and has facilitated the sale of "more than 5,000 Starlink devices" by connecting ordinary citizens with underground resellers, he [Ahmadian] said. (BARRON'S)” The smuggling process involves Holistic Resilience’s collaboration with European companies that produce Starlink technology, which neighboring countries then filter into Iran through smuggling networks. NetFreedom Pioneers' Emilia James estimates that there are "tens of thousands" of Starlink devices in the country of 92 million.

Perks: 

• Mahsa Alert is a website but also has Android and iOS apps, making it lightweight and easy to use across devices. 

• Volunteers engineered the platform to operate under offline use (obviously necessary). 

• Mahsa maps strikes, and has plotted “danger zones”: areas that are at particular risk of attack.

• “The map also includes locations of thousands of CCTV cameras, suspected government checkpoints, and other domestic infrastructure. Medical facilities, such as hospitals and pharmacies, are included on the map along with other resources like the locations of religious sites and past protests.(WIRED)”

Constraints:

• Despite the proficiency and high operability of the app, a volunteer project given the severity of the conditions in Iran is not enough to substantiate missing government service.

• App is limited by resource constraints and the potential risks posed by smuggling operations. 

• There are examples of structural weaknesses, and the possibility for Mahsa’s hardware to be hacked. There was an incident of Mahsa’s platform being taken offline by ‘Malware’ and the original site being replaced by uploading Mahsa’s domain to Malware analysis platforms (i.e, VirusTotal). “The method used in this case is an example of an indirect attack: instead of attacking the server or penetrating the system, the attacker attempted to exploit the automated mechanisms of the cybersecurity industry to damage the domain’s reputation so that users and networks would block access to it. (RAAZNET)”

Despite the constraints, Masha is a perfect example of the potential for modern technological advancements to be used in service of regular people through third party civic engagement. Especially given the climate of the tech industry, it is easy to think of advancements offering only dreary omens for the future of human exploitation, but the work done on Masha gives us much needed perspective on the hopeful alternative.